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WHEN, WHAT, AND WHY DO STATES
CHOOSE TO DELEGATE?
BARBARA KOREMENOS*
I
INTRODUCTION
The introductory article in this symposium offers a rich conceptual
framework for understanding international delegation. Curtis A. Bradley and
Judith Kelley make great strides in variable conceptualization, defining and
elaborating some key dimensions of delegation and thereby serving as a very
useful springboard for more refined theoretical and empirical work.1 Many of
the other articles in this symposium provide case-study evidence of delegation
in some major agreements, with some of them richly examining the
consequences of delegation for the implementation of the agreements.2
Employing a random sample of international agreements, this article is the
first systematic look at when, what, and why states choose to delegate.3 As the
descriptive statistics below indicate, delegation is widespread, and, as the theory
elaborated here would predict, it is more likely to be incorporated into
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* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan. The editors, the other authors
featured in this special issue, and George Tsebelis made many useful comments on earlier drafts,
greatly improving this article. Michelle Allendoerfer, Eleni Gouvas, Jennifer Kavanagh, Johannes
Urpelainen, and Peter Wennerholm provided excellent research assistance. This article could not have
been completed without them.
1. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Judith Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2008).
2. See, e.g., Michael J. Tierney, Delegation Success and Policy Failure: Collective Delegation and
the Search for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (Winter 2008).
3. Individual scholars know a great deal about the nature and consequences of delegation
relationships within certain international agreements and organizations. See, e.g., Alexander
Thompson, Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission, 60
INT’L ORG. 1 (2006) (examining the United Nations Security Council to explain why states channel
coercive policies through international organizations). For such consequences within certain issue
areas, see, e.g., Lisa Martin, Distribution, Information, and Delegation to International Organizations:
The Case of IMF Conditionality, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006); Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International
Courts, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 22 (2006) (showing a trend towards creating and using international
courts); David L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency
Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003) (examining lending policies
for environmentally significant projects administered through the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank). All of these scholars have gathered their own very detailed and compelling evidence
within these agreements or organizations or within issue areas. Nonetheless, generalizing from this very
small sample of institutionalized international cooperation and international delegation is often
misleading.
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agreements when states are trying to solve complex cooperation problems and
when larger numbers of states are involved in the cooperative endeavor.
Throughout this article, internal delegation is defined as delegation to a
collective formed by the members of the agreement themselves, as
distinguished from external delegation, defined as delegation to a third party
outside of the agreement. This distinction turns out to be quite relevant.
Other interesting, and often surprising, findings emerge. For example, given
this initial probe into the data, delegation is evidently not limited by factors like
hegemony or risk aversion, whereas democracy is negatively correlated with
delegation. Additionally, this article analyzes the correlation between
delegation and other dependent variables—that is, other institutional design
variables that are under the control of the states making the agreement. Both
withdrawal clauses (also known as exit or denunciation clauses) and finite
duration provisions are significantly correlated with delegation. The positive
correlation between withdrawal clauses and delegation suggests that states are
minimizing their sovereignty costs by creating an outside option. The negative
correlation between finite duration provisions and delegation suggests that
delegation can function as a form of flexibility, thereby acting as a substitute for
finite duration. This article confirms the importance of international delegation
as a topic of focused study by documenting it as an important and nontrivial
empirical phenomenon.
The empirical work in this article is anchored in the theoretical framework
of Rational Design.4 The starting point for Rational Design is a very simple
observation: institutionalized international cooperation is organized in
significantly diversified ways.5 More important, however, is the theoretical
reason for this observation: different international institutions are solving
different combinations of cooperation problems. This implies that differences
among international institutions are not random; rather, states and other
international actors shape institutions to solve the specific problems they face.
In other words, design variations are largely the result of rational, purposive
interactions. The goal of the Rational Design volume is to offer a systematic
account of five design variables (membership, scope, centralization, control, and
flexibility—the dependent variables in the framework), relating them to
recurrent cooperation problems faced by states, the independent variables.
This article uses Rational Design to explain the institutional-design choice
of international delegation, where delegation is equivalent to the rationaldesign variable of centralization. A state delegates functions to an international
body if the expected benefits from delegation outweigh the expected costs.

4. See generally Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55
INT’L ORG. 761 (2001) (elaborating the theory of Rational Design as applied to international
organizations).
5. Included in institutionalized international cooperation are any explicit arrangements,
negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, or authorize behavior; thus this
includes the over 50,000 international agreements that are registered with the United Nations.

06__KOREMENOS.DOC

Winter 2008]

6/9/2008 8:04:12 AM

WHEN STATES DELEGATE

153

Empirically, the extent and type of delegation should vary according to the
importance of delegation in solving the particular cooperation problems faced
by states. From this perspective, the debate on whether delegation is an
important part of international law (not the perspective emphasized in this
special issue) is misplaced. A more fine-grained theory predicts that delegation
is important when the underlying cooperation problem requires it.
Rational Design theory is sketched out in Part II. The data are presented in
Part III, followed by a detailed set of descriptive statistics in Part IV. The theory
is then tested in Part V, and Part VI concludes and points to new directions for
research once more data are collected.
II
RATIONAL DESIGN THEORY
Given its primacy in Rational Design theory, what exactly is a cooperation
problem? One way of conceptualizing the notion is to focus on the categories of
interests and constraints. Interests are captured in two of the Rational Design
independent variables, with the enforcement problem referring “to the strength
of individual actors’ incentives to cheat”6 and the distribution problem
depending “on how each actor compares its preferred alternative to other
actors’ preferred alternatives.”7 Constraints are captured with variables
(italicized below) that address both information and beliefs: uncertainty about
preferences (that is, uncertainty regarding what the other state partners’
preferences are), uncertainty about behavior (not being able to decipher easily
whether the other state partners are cooperating or defecting), and uncertainty
about the state of the world (that is, uncertainty regarding the consequences of
cooperation—who will benefit the most, et cetera). To these, a few more
variables can be added, including the commitment problem (defined as a
domestic commitment problem or a time-inconsistency problem).8
With respect to international delegation, the set of rational-design
conjectures surrounding the dependent variable centralization (defined as
whether institutional tasks are performed by a single focal entity or not) are
pertinent.9 Of sixteen suggested univariate10 conjectures relating one
6. Koremenos et al., supra note 4, at 776.
7. Id. at 775.
8. Barbara Koremenos, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) [hereinafter
KOREMENOS, CONTINENT]. In CONTINENT, I add the following possible cooperation problems:
encouraging positive externalities, discouraging negative externalities, deadlock, and “other.” The
other category includes areas of cooperation such as foreign aid for which there are no or few strategic
considerations and pure coordination games without uncertainty. More than one answer can be chosen
for each agreement. In CONTINENT and in Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International
Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD.
189 (2007) [hereinafter Koremenos, Which Half?], multiple examples of the operationalization of these
cooperation problems are given, as well as elaboration on how they were coded.
9. Given that all the agreements in the sample include at least two state actors, whenever tasks
are performed by a single focal actor, the states are delegating.
10. In univariate analyses, each variable in a data set is analyzed separately.
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independent variable to one dependent variable, four conjectures involve
centralization.11 Three of the four stipulate some aspect of the cooperation
problem the states are facing as the independent variable: Centralization
increases with the severity of the enforcement problem, with uncertainty about
behavior, and with uncertainty about the state of the world.12 The fourth
conjecture is a transactions-cost argument: Centralization increases with
number, where number can capture the literal number of states or their
heterogeneity, or both.13
To elaborate a bit on the underlying logic of these conjectures, consider the
following: Uncertainty about the behavior of states engaged in a cooperative
endeavor can be reduced by developing centralized monitoring systems,
whereas uncertainty about the state of the world can be partially offset by the
pooling of information, which is often done most efficiently through delegation.
When enforcement problems are present, some kind of delegated punishment
(for example, through a body like the Security Council) can help deter the
problem of cheating. States facing internal commitment problems, perhaps
because of a tumultuous recent political history, can often more easily commit
credibly to cooperative endeavors if they delegate some authority to a third
party. Essentially, when cooperation problems are complex (here including
enforcement problems and commitment problems as well as uncertainty about
behavior and the state of the world), delegation helps states solve the problem
or problems more efficiently.14 Regarding the transaction-costs conjecture, when
heterogeneity is high, routine administration and decisionmaking is complicated
among the participants; delegating some of those tasks can be efficient.
Similarly, increasing the number of participants increases the transaction costs
of implementing an international agreement; once again, delegation may be the
efficient choice, allowing states to more easily coordinate their actions.
Rational Design does not distinguish between external and internal
delegation, but according to its logic, one could argue that, if it is in states’
interests to delegate, the larger and more heterogeneous the membership, the
more likely it is that external delegation will be chosen. Externally delegating to
a preexisting third party saves on the transaction costs of creating a new body
and, more importantly, allows states to bypass the costly decisionmaking that is
characteristic of large and heterogeneous groups. Additionally, external bodies

11. Koremenos et al., supra note 4, at 787–91.
12. Id.
13. Id. Specifically, the variable number can capture asymmetries with respect to both power and
interests. In the empirical analyses below, number, power, and heterogeneity of interests are included
as separate variables.
14. Cooperation problems not included in the category of complex problems include encouraging
endeavors with positive externalities, discouraging those with negative externalities, and solving
coordination games. Though uncertainty about preferences could be considered a complex problem,
few if any of the agreements in the sample have that as one of their underlying problems, which is
interesting in and of itself. See Koremenos, CONTINENT, supra note 8.

06__KOREMENOS.DOC

Winter 2008]

6/9/2008 8:04:12 AM

WHEN STATES DELEGATE

155

may be more objective and neutral, and hence they may be better equipped to
come up with solutions that are acceptable to heterogeneous treaty members.
Many argue that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly
important to international cooperation, particularly in the fields of the
environment and human rights.15 It is worth considering explicitly what
delegation to NGOs looks like, how it works, and what advantages it may
provide to states. Rational Design suggests that states would choose to delegate
functions to NGOs—instead of to an internal body or an IGO (which is also
composed of states)—only if there is some explicit advantage to such
delegation. Preliminary research on selective NGO participation appears to
confirm this conjecture. “Nongovernmental organizations . . . are increasingly
important participants in international environmental institutions,” especially as
these delegation agreements become more and more complex.16 Kal Raustiala
has argued that the choice of states to give a role to NGOs is “based on the
confluence of governmental incentives and NGO comparative advantages and
resources.”17 NGOs have even begun to take over what were traditionally
“states-only” activities.18 Delegation to an NGO, particularly for functions like
compliance monitoring and dispute resolution, may increase the impartiality of
such processes and thus enhance the overall effectiveness of the agreement.19
NGOs may be able to serve this function through the links they create between
local and global needs and actors.20 But they may also focus exclusively on
compliance by their own governments or have very limited access to the
information they need to make accurate and consistent judgments.21
III
DATA
The data used in this article are drawn from the United Nations Treaty
Series.22 This database features the most comprehensive set of formal

15. See, e.g., Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS passim (1998) (arguing that NGOs have made an impact in
human rights and environmental politics by bringing attention to particular issues and changing states’
perceptions of their national interests).
16. Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT’L STUD. Q.
719, 732–33 (1997).
17. Id. at 720.
18. Id. at 719.
19. Id. at 728–30.
20. Thomas Princen & Matthias Finger, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN WORLD POLITICS 33 (1994).
21. Oliver Meier & Clare Tenner, Nongovernemental Monitoring of International Agreements, in
VERIFICATION YEARBOOK 207, 217 (Trevor Findlay ed., 2000).
22. United Nations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Jan. 28,
2008). The data are gathered as part of a research project supported by the National Science
Foundation CAREER Award: “Designing International Agreements: Theoretical Development, Data
Collection, and Empirical Analysis” (SES-0094376). The Internet collection at the time the sample was
drawn contained over 34,000 international agreements “which have been published in hard copy in over
1,450 volumes, which corresponds to all treaties and subsequent actions registered up to December
1986.” Id.
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international agreements concluded since the end of World War II as well as
many agreements initiated in earlier periods, in particular those registered with
the League of Nations. Unlike many databases that feature agreements from
one country or region, which are either multilateral or bilateral, and which
surround one issue area, like the environment, this database transcends the
number and identity of parties, and the agreements it contains are divided into
a number of issue areas. The random sample used here is conditional on four
issue areas: economics, environment, human rights, and security. It includes
both multilateral and bilateral agreements.23
Inclusion in the sample required that at least two state parties be involved,
thereby eliminating any bilateral agreements between only one state and an
international organization. With respect to Figure 1, “The Delegation Chain,”
found in the Bradley and Kelley article,24 the theories and data in this article are
focused on delegations from the left-hand column to the middle column,
although some agreements will mention redelegation from the collective body
formed by the agreement to a third party. For example, in the American
Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San José, Costa Rica (San José Pact),25
two internal bodies are created: the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The tasks delegated to
these bodies represent internal delegation. However, Article 40,26 which
describes the role and functions of the Commission, mentions what Bradley and
Kelley would call redelegation27 from the Commission to the preexisting
Secretariat of the Organization of American States: the “Secretariat services for
the Commission shall be furnished by the appropriate specialized unit of the
General Secretariat of the Organization. This unit shall be provided with the
resources required to accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the Commission.”28
Hence this agreement includes both internal delegation and external delegation
(accomplished through redelegation).
A coding instrument records the characteristics of the agreements.
Importantly, the coders for this project are extensively trained in order to give
them high levels of both competency and consistency, with the majority going
through nine to twelve months of course-based training that includes both
theoretical training and practice coding runs. Two coders independently code

23. In the sample used for this article, sixty-four of the ninety-seven agreements are bilateral. The
reason for this is that bilateral cooperation is far more prevalent than multilateral cooperation. For
example, at the time the sample was drawn, the online version of the UNTS contained 2,330
multilateral agreements and 32,936 bilateral agreements. Nothing about the design of the datacollection project precludes it from including other issue areas; the four chosen are included because
they are currently the most important in the international cooperation literature. See the Appendix for
a list of the set of agreements used in the empirical analyses.
24. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 6.
25. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San José,
Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 [hereinafter San José Pact].
26. Id. at 154.
27. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 6.
28. San José Pact, supra note 25, at 154.

06__KOREMENOS.DOC

Winter 2008]

6/9/2008 8:04:12 AM

WHEN STATES DELEGATE

157

each agreement using an online survey instrument. Upon completion, an
intercoder-reliability report is generated for the 375 questions for which there
are “quantitative” answers, for example, yes or no, multiple choice, or a specific
number. The average coded agreement is characterized by disagreement on
approximately fifteen questions, or four percent of the quantitative questions;
the range so far has been between two percent and fifteen percent. The
inconsistencies are then resolved through a close rereading of the agreement
and supervised discussion involving the original coders, a trained graduate
student, and the author.
One of the most extensive sections of the coding instrument is that which
addresses the bodies (if any) created by the agreement. These bodies are
usually composed of some kind of representative of the member states, but they
can also be composed of experts chosen by the members. Because they are new
bodies created by the agreement, they are a form of internal delegation. A
shorter section of the coding instrument addresses tasks delegated to third
parties and asks about the kind of tasks delegated as well as what kind of third
party is implicated. This section captures external delegation. Hence, what the
distinction is capturing is whether new bodies are created or existing ones are
used.
In their concept article, Bradley and Kelley also include both internal and
external delegation in their definition of international delegation.29 Within their
framework, internal delegation would be delegation to a collective body or
subgroup of states within the agreement (what some call a pooling of
sovereignty), while external delegation would include delegation to a third
party outside of the agreement.30 In Figure 1, internal delegation encompasses
the first two rows of the middle column while external delegation includes the
bottom row in Bradley and Kelley’s article. In principle, each of the possible
tasks delegated can be through either internal or external delegation. For
example, in the data presented here, the secretariat function is sometimes
handled through internal delegation and sometimes through external (and, of
course, sometimes not delegated at all), as the first two columns of Table 1
illustrate.
To help bring these two concepts to life, consider the following agreement
from the random sample. In an investment agreement between the United
Kingdom and Egypt, the states must submit their dispute to an arbitral body if
they cannot settle it diplomatically.31 The members of this body are chosen by
the disputing states, but if they cannot find mutually acceptable members, the
selection process is turned over to an external source, either the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes or the International Court of

29. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 3–9.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.–Egypt, June 11, 1975, 1032
U.N.T.S. 32.
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Justice.32 Thus, the arbitral body is usually internal, but if the members cannot
agree, it becomes external. The arbitral body listens to arguments, considers the
facts, and, in this case, makes binding recommendations to resolve the dispute.33
Once a body has been identified as internal, the coders are asked to identify
in detail the characteristics of the members, the procedures for making
decisions, and other details about the functioning and purpose of the body,
including what tasks are delegated to it. The list of possible delegated tasks
appears in Table 1 below.34

32. Id.
33. This is one of the most “controversial cases” of internal delegation because it could be claimed
that, when disputing members must each choose an arbitrator to form a panel, these arbitrators are
neutral third parties. Nonetheless, they could just as easily be retired judges from the member states
and hence biased. The conceptualization of internal delegation in this hardest case stems from the
assumption that the units of analysis that bargain or negotiate at the international level are the states—
not the governments within those states. The unitary-actor assumption is a good baseline as well as a
focal point. Although it is known that domestic politics implies that it is not always the case that the
state should be modeled as unitary, it becomes very difficult in reading agreements to ascertain which
level of the state is the one bargaining, influencing, being influenced, et cetera. There is simply not
enough detail in agreements to discover such things. In contrast, the state is a salient unit. Given this,
whenever a body is (or is likely to be) composed of some representative of at least some of the member
states, this body is coded as internal—that is, a body created by the agreement and, hence, a form of
internal delegation. For example, suppose that when Bolivia and the United States need to arbitrate a
dispute, two very professional lawyers, one from the United States and one from Bolivia, with
international reputations for being fair, are appointed as the arbitrators. If the government were used
as the unit of analysis, this would be external delegation because the lawyers do not represent the
governments. But given the assumption that the nation-state is the unit of analysis, the lawyers are
citizens of the disputing parties as well as experts. Hence, this is a case of internal delegation. Other
than the delegation of certain dispute resolution, all other forms of internal delegation are clear-cut
examples of collective bodies or subgroups of states.
34. See Barabara Koremenos, Glossary: Delegated Tasks,
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/koremenos/files/glossary_-_delegated_tasks_jan08.doc (last visited Feb. 6,
2008) for a definition and example of each of the tasks listed in Table 1.
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IV
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This part presents a first look at the landscape of delegation across the random sample of agreements. Figure 1 shows the incidence of delegation and
whether it is internal, external, or both.
Figure 1: Types of Delegation (Number of Agreements)
60

Number of Agreements

50
40
30
20
10
0
Total Delegation

Both Internal and
External Delegation

Only Internal
Delegation

Only External
Delegation

Cooperation
without Delegation

Type of Delegation

One of the most striking things about Figure 1 is how widespread delegation
is, with over half of the international agreements calling for it in some form or
another. About the same number of agreements call for internal and external
delegation, with the use of both in a single agreement being somewhat less
common but certainly not negligible. This is not surprising, given that there are
costs to creating bodies as well as to delegating to existing ones; hence, states
may have an incentive to choose the form of delegation selectively. It is also
notable that although external delegation is often cited as having higher
“sovereignty costs,” or as placing higher constraints on signatory states, at first
glance the data above do not suggest that states are any less likely to use
external delegation. This suggests that perhaps external delegation is not
viewed by states in such terms, but instead is seen as being the more effective
form of delegation in many cases. Of course, any firm conclusions must take
into account just what gets delegated internally versus externally.
Although all of these third parties are preexisting intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), in six agreements in the sample, NGOs are mentioned as
well. Given the field’s interest in the role of nonstate actors, it is worth looking
at what delegation to NGOs looks like in the random sample. Out of those six
agreements that delegate functions to NGOs, four are in the area of human
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rights. In the San José Pact, signatory states give an NGO the authority to bring
a petition against a signatory state if the NGO believes that a violation has
occurred.35 Specifically, the Pact calls on “[a]ny person or group of persons, or
any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of
the Organization” to “lodge petitions with the Commission containing
denunciations or complaints of violation” of the Convention.36
Similarly, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms delegates compliance-monitoring functions to an
NGO.37 Article 25 notes that
[t]he Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe from any persons, nongovernmental organisation or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Contracting
Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognizes the
38
competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.

The agreement therefore gives NGOs the authority to monitor state compliance
with the agreement and to bring petitions against noncompliant states when
appropriate.
Figure 2 shows the incidence of delegation by issue area.
Figure 2: Types of Delegation by Issue Area
90%
80%
Percent of Agreements
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Cooperation without delegation is most common in the security and
economic issue areas. For security agreements, this descriptive statistic seems to

35. San José Pact, supra note 25, at 155.
36. Id.
37. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
38. Id. at 236–38.
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confirm the conventional wisdom that states may be less willing to turn issues
pertaining to national security over to an international body. With respect to
economic agreements, an inverse relationship between precision and delegation
can be expected, and economic agreements are, on average, far more precise
than agreements in any of the other three issue areas. 39 Cooperation without
delegation is least likely in human rights. Moreover, and interestingly, humanrights agreements never incorporate internal delegation solely; rather, they
either delegate only to third parties or they create an internal body and delegate
to a third as well. This is not surprising, given that human-rights agreements
tend to govern internal affairs; hence, delegation to a third party may enhance
credibility.
These simple, descriptive statistics open up a set of questions regarding the
role of the existing international environment—most importantly, existing
institutions—in the formation of new agreements and the process of delegation.
The formation of new international law is often an iterative process, with states
building off of old institutions to adapt to their new needs.
The types of delegated authority discussed by Bradley and Kelley can
include functions that represent a substantial delegation of authority. These
include, for example, legislative tasks such as the power to amend treaties and
mandate compliance, adjudicative tasks such as the settlement of disputes, and
compliance-monitoring and enforcement, such that the body to which power is
delegated works to enforce the treaty either through centralized investigations
or more locally through peer pressure. The delegated bodies are used for lesscentral tasks as well, for example, to create administrative rules to implement
the treaty, set the agenda for the organization, and provide research and
advisory support.40 Table 1 shows what kinds of tasks are actually delegated
across the random sample of agreements. Although the list of tasks does not
overlap entirely with Bradley and Kelley’s, it includes many of the same types
of functions and levels of delegation, including high levels of delegation, such as
compliance monitoring, dispute settlement, and enforcement, as well as
delegation of less central tasks such as administrative functions, the drafting of
rules to ease implementation, and information dissemination.

39. Barbara Koremenos, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RULEMAKING (2007).
40. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 10–16.
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Table 1: Tasks Delegated to Institutions
Number of Agreements Using
Tasks Delegated

Figurehead (no real
substantive role or
duty, but a
ceremonial role)
Secretariat or
Administrative
Duties
Financial
Administration
Representing the
International
Organization in its
Interactions with
Countries or Other
Organizations
Collection of
Information
Collation of
Information
Analysis of
Information
Dissemination of
Information
Making Rules or
Laws in Addition to
Those Stipulated in
the Agreement
Having a Role in
Amending the
Agreement
Having a Role in
Implementing the
Agreement’s Rules
or Law

Number of
Agreements that
Delegate Same
Task to New and
Existing
Institutions

Internal Delegation

External
Delegation

0

0

0

8

10

2

7

3

0

5

0

0

9

7

1

6

1

0

11

1

0

12

6

1

10

0

0

4

4

1

10

6

1
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Vetoing Rules or
Decisions Made by
Another Body
Presiding Over,
Setting the Agenda
for, or Overseeing
the Reports of
Some Other Body’s
Meetings
Deciding which
New Members May
Join
Granting
Exceptions Under
an Escape Clause
Monitoring
Compliance
Soft Procedures to
Encourage
Compliance, like
Review Meetings
Overseeing
Complaint(s) and
Punishment(s) for
Noncompliance
Having a Role in
Dispute Resolution
Redistributing
Property Rights
Assigning New
Property Rights
Addressing New,
Nonredistributive
Issues
Rights of Residual
Control
Other
Sample Size = 97
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0

0

0

7

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

8

9

2

5

4

0

6

6

1

27

30

19

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8

8

2
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As the table indicates, dispute resolution is the most commonly delegated
function, both internally and externally.41 External delegation of dispute
resolution usually involves delegating authority to an existing arbitration
tribunal or an international court.
For tasks other than dispute resolution, some facet of the implementation of
the agreement, as well as the analysis and dissemination of information, are the
tasks most often internally delegated. Tasks related to the monitoring and
punishment of noncompliers are also at times delegated, suggesting that
internal delegation may be an important enforcement tool as well. It is also
worth noting that the task of making laws in addition to those stipulated in the
agreement is internally delegated in about ten percent of the agreements and is
never externally delegated. This strongly suggests that states want to retain
control over the evolution of their cooperation and are not apt to delegate such
tasks to a third party. Secretariat and administrative duties, collection of
information, compliance monitoring, and punishment for noncompliance are
the tasks that are most frequently externally delegated. In fact, ten percent of
the agreements delegate monitoring functions to an external body. Significantly,
the table shows that delegation is used for a wide range of tasks, tasks that are
important and in some cases essential to the functioning of agreements. Indeed,
delegated bodies are involved in the implementation, revision, and monitoring
of the agreement and often have the power to settle disputes and enforce
compliance. The actions of delegated bodies in these functions will have real
effects on signatory states.
Given the statistic in Figure 1—that about thirty percent of the agreements
use both internal and external delegation—the third column of Table 1 delves
into whether a redundancy is built into some agreements, or whether different
tasks are delegated internally and externally.
Delegation of the same tasks to new and old institutions is not all that
common, except in dispute resolution, when it occurs for about twenty percent
of the agreements in the sample. It is likely that most of these cases are ones in
which dispute resolution is first delegated to an internal body and then to an
external body only if no agreement can be reached at the first stage. One
example in which the same (nondispute resolution) functions are delegated to
new and old institutions is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in

41. In her contribution to this volume, Karen Alter elaborates four roles that a judiciary can take:
dispute resolution, administrative review, enforcement, and constitutional review. Karen Alter,
Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 37 (Winter 2008). Thus far in the random sample, only one agreement has actually created a
court: The San José Pact created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has constitutional
review and dispute resolution capabilities (adjudication). The court does not have enforcement
capabilities; it can only make recommendations on “binding” rulings (rulings are only binding if
member states recognize the jurisdiction of the court). Therefore, with that one exception, whenever a
court, such as the ones Alter analyzes, is mentioned in the agreement, it is called upon to help with
dispute resolution between the parties to some other agreement, with none of the other functions being
mentioned.
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Latin America (the Tlateloco Treaty).42 This agreement delegates compliance
monitoring internally to the “Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America” (OPANAL), and externally to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).43 OPANAL is given the responsibility of holding
“periodic . . . consultations” among member states on matters relating to
member compliance and obligations.44 The IAEA is tasked with conducting
special investigations of member-state activity when necessary or when
requested by another signatory.45 Initially, both OPANAL and the IAEA were
given this responsibility, but following a 1992 amendment, only the IAEA
retains it. By delegating compliance monitoring to both internal and external
bodies, states may have hoped to combine the state control provided by internal
delegation with the “teeth” afforded by having an external body involved. What
they learned, perhaps, is that, in this case, the external body provided the
needed credibility.
The next issue, relationships between voting rules and internal delegation, is
significant because it relates to the autonomy of the international body as well
as to the costs states face when they delegate authority. The autonomy of a
body, Bradley and Kelley suggest, is determined by the level of state oversight,
including the reporting requirements of the body, the precision of the body’s
mandate, the decisionmaking procedures of the body (for which unanimous
processes reduce the body’s independence), the permanence of the body, and
the mechanism through which the body gets its funding.46 The analysis of voting
rules here captures the decisionmaking-procedure aspect of Bradley and
Kelley’s autonomy concept. Bodies that have voting rules requiring unanimity
(“unanimity rules” or “unanimity voting”) are likely to have lower levels of
autonomy than those with some type of majoritarian voting rules. Similarly,
bodies that require supermajorities may have less autonomy than those that
need only simple majorities. The level of autonomy given to the international
body, Bradley and Kelley note, will also affect the cost of delegating authority.47
When states continue to control the body to which power is delegated, the cost
of delegation remains low and they are not forced to compromise on their
preferred policy all that much.48 However, when the body is given substantial
independence, states sacrifice more of their individual autonomy through the
delegation of authority and may be forced to accept policies that vary drastically
from their ideal.49 By considering how voting power is distributed, the analysis
of voting rules here sheds light on the costs of delegation, probing not only
42.
326.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S.
Id. at 334, 340.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 342–44.
Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 20.
Id. at 28–30.
Id. at 30
Id. at 28.

06__KOREMENOS.DOC

166

6/9/2008 8:04:12 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 71:151

whether states rely more heavily on unanimity or majority voting in their
delegation, but also whether weighted or one-vote-per-member voting rules are
used in those cases where majority voting is permitted. In other words, do the
rich and powerful control the delegation more?
It may be also be the case that unanimity voting rules are more common in
instances of delegation in specific issue areas—for example, security—or when
the delegation includes certain types of functions—for example, imposing
sanctions or amending the treaty. If powerful states rely on weighted voting to
control their delegation, not only will the delegated body have less
independence overall, but the autonomy costs50 may also be lower for these
powerful states than for smaller signatory nations. More specifically, we can see
whether agreements involving superpowers are more likely to have asymmetric
voting rules for any internal bodies. If this is the case, it would suggest that
powerful countries do carefully protect their autonomy when allowing
delegation. Findings suggesting that states do guard their delegation would not
necessarily imply delegated bodies are weak, but rather that state actors use
delegation as a tool to advance their interests but are careful not to let it get out
of hand.
Table 2: Voting Rules for Internal Delegation

Unanimity Required
Simple Majority
Super Majority
Special Majority
Varies Depending on Issue
Not Specified
Sample Size = 56

50. Autonomy costs are defined by Bradley and Kelley. Id.

Number of Bodies
4
21
3
0
4
24
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Table 3: Determination of Representation for Internal Delegation

Fixed Number of Representatives per State
Number of Representatives Proportional to
Member State’s Population
Number of Representatives Proportional to
Member State’s Financial Contribution
Number of Representatives Determined by
some Other Characteristic (for example,
geography, dispersion, nuclear status)
Other
Not Specified
Sample Size = 56

Number of Bodies
28
0
0
0
18
11

Table 4: Allocation of Votes for Internal Delegation

One per Member State
Number of Votes Proportional to Member
State’s Population
Number of Votes Proportional to Member
State’s Financial Contribution
Number of Votes Determined by Some Other
Characteristic
(for
example,
geography,
dispersion, nuclear status)
Other
Not Specified
Sample Size = 51

Number of Bodies
20
0
1
2
3
25

The tables above indicate, first, that the large majority of internally delegated
bodies have a fixed number of representatives per nation state and voting rules
that allow one vote per member state, and, second, that unanimity voting rules
are rare (less than ten percent of the bodies). This suggests that such bodies are
not dominated by certain states (for example, large powers) and that, at least
for internal delegation, states do not often guard their delegation with
unanimity or weighted voting. These descriptive statistics support the argument
that delegated bodies are given the autonomy to take real action and thus can
have real effects on signing states.
Further, probes into the data suggest that there is a negative relationship
between the inclusion of a unanimity rule and the agreement issue areas of
security, environment, and human rights. The results do not approach statistical
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significance, however. In economic issue areas, there is a positive relationship
with the inclusion of a unanimity rule, a result that is significant at the 0.10
level. For types of functions that are delegated to internal bodies, there is a
positive relationship between the delegation of dispute-resolution functions and
the use of a unanimity rule. This result is not statistically significant at
conventional levels (p=0.1488). There is also an inverse relationship between
the inclusion of unanimity rules and the delegation of amendment functions as
well those of overseeing complaints and punishments, but they are not
statistically significant.
Finally, the relationship between whether a superpower is a member and the
use of weighted voting depends on how weighted voting is coded. When, in the
table, other types of voting-allocation rules are coded as weighted voting, the
relationship between weighted voting and superpower membership in the
agreement is statistically significant and positive. This suggests that when either
the United States or (the former) USSR is a signatory to an agreement, it is
likely to seek out weighted voting rules. (However, when other types of votingallocation rules are coded as either not weighted or as missing data, the
relationship between the presence of a superpower party to the treaty and
weighted voting is not statistically significant. This may be a result of a very
small group of agreements that have any weighted voting, by any coding
scheme. When other is coded as weighted, only three agreements create bodies
with weighted voting; when other is either coded as not weighted or as missing
data, the number of agreements with weighted voting is only one.)
V
FINDINGS: WHEN IS DELEGATION MOST LIKELY?
Rational Design theory calls attention to a set of independent variables
whose presence would increase the likelihood that states incorporate some kind
of delegation into their agreements.51 The subsections that follow address each
of these variables. Because these data are new, I discuss the probits one variable
at a time before turning to the multivariate analysis below.
A. Delegation and the Complexity of the Cooperation Problem
Dispute-resolution provisions are much more common in agreements that
deal with complex cooperation problems.52 The explanation for this variation in
dispute-resolution provisions based on Rational Design theory is that states
rationally include dispute-resolution provisions only when they expect that such
provisions will be needed in the future. (Recall that each of the problems
included in the variable complex cooperation problem calls for centralization to
help solve the problem.53) In signing agreements with more complex
51. See supra Part I.
52. Koremenos, Which Half, supra note 8, at 189.
53. See supra Part II.
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cooperation problems, states are likely to anticipate future disagreements, and
rightly so, and more likely to see dispute-resolution provisions as necessary.
This explanation is strongly supported in the statistical analyses presented here.
When the delegation is broadened to include all forms of delegation, not
just dispute resolution, both external and internal delegation appear to be more
common when there are complex cooperation problems (see Table 5). When
states are forced to overcome complex cooperation problems, they use
delegation as a tool to accomplish this challenge. Delegation can allow them to
deal with compliance monitoring, dispute resolution, and even the sanctioning
of defecting states, thereby addressing the enforcement problem. It can also be
used to address the commitment problem by increasing the extent to which the
agreement “ties the hands” of signing states. The effect is larger for external
delegation, perhaps because external organizations are seen as more neutral
and credible than internal bodies,54 which may increase their effectiveness in
overcoming cooperation problems. This would be the case especially when
states are trying to solve commitment problems: a third party would be seen as
more credible than the state itself when the state has voting power. (In terms of
marginal effects, the presence of a complex problem increases the probability of
external delegation by nearly forty percent and internal delegation by twentyone percent).
Table 5: Results of Probit Analysis of Complexity and Delegation
Independent Variable
Complex Problem

Dependent Variable 1
External Delegation
1.14†
(0.334)

Dependent Variable 2
Internal Delegation
0.562*
(0.303)

Sample Size = 97
Standard Errors are in Parentheses
* p<0.1
† p<0.01
Note: “Complex Problem” is defined as Uncertainty about Behavior or the
State of World, Enforcement Problem, or Commitment Problem

B. Delegation and Number and Heterogeneity of Parties
Rational Design theory predicts that delegation will increase with the
number of states involved in a cooperative endeavor.55 Using the number of
participants at the original negotiation of the agreement as a measure, the effect

54. See Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 16 (1998).
55. See supra Part II.
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number has on the choice of delegation can be analyzed by performing a probit
regression. Table 6 illustrates the results.56
Table 6: Results of Probit Analysis of Number of Parties and Delegation
Independent Variable

Dependent Variable 1
External Delegation
0.541†
(0.128)

Number of Parties
(logged)
Sample Size = 97
Standard Errors are in Parentheses
† p<0.01

Dependent Variable 2
Internal Delegation
0.078
(0.107)

Table 6 illustrates a positive and significant relationship between number and
external delegation only. With respect to marginal effects, as the number of
parties changes from two to three, the probability of external delegation
increases by eight percent, whereas the probability of internal delegation
increases only by 1.2%.57
According to the theory articulated above, delegation should increase with
the heterogeneity of the parties.58 The narrower argument is that delegation will
be used increasingly to solve disputes as states’ preferences become more
diverse. This prediction constrasts directly with that by Hawkins et al., which
states, “The greater the preference heterogeneity of any group of states,
therefore, the less likely they will be to delegate to an [international
organization].”59
Table 7 shows some simple probit results from the perspective of the
relationship between the heterogeneity of members and delegation.60
56. A log of the number of participants is used, since the unlogged variable is highly right-skewed
and its log is almost perfectly normally distributed.
57. I selected two parties since sixty-four of the treaties are bilateral and hence a one-unit increase
is standard. Then I took the natural log of 2 and 3 to perform the calculations.
58. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 273 (1974) (“For example, as suggested earlier, we expect (and observe) more delegation of
legislative power by the United States Congress than by the British Parliament because the costs of
producing legislation are lower under the parliamentary system with its well disciplined parties and its
effectively unicameral legislature.”).
59. Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and
Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 21
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
60. Gartzke and Jo’s “Affinity of Nations Index,” which measures the similarity in states’
preferences based on voting preferences in the United Nations General Assembly, is used as a measure
of heterogeneity. Eric Gartzke & Dong-Joon Jo, The Affinity of Nations Index, 1946-1996, Nov. 8, 2002,
htttp://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke. Because the Affinity data are dyadic, I simply take the Affinity value for
each bilateral agreement. For the multilateral agreements, I first create a dyad for each pair of
signatories. Hence, if there are three signatories, there are three dyads; if there are four signatories,
there are six dyads, and so on. For each multilateral agreement, the “weakest link assumption” is used,
taking the Affinity value of the dyad with the least similar interests.
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Table 7: Results of Probit Analysis of Heterogeneity of Members and
Delegation
Dependent Variable 1
Dependent Variable 2
External Delegation
Internal Delegation
1.295†
0.418*
Heterogeneity
(0.307)
(0.254)
Sample Size = 91 (Affinity data are not available for all agreements)
Standard Errors are in Parentheses
* p<0.1
† p<0.01
Independent Variable

As Table 7 illustrates, there does seem to be a positive relationship between
heterogeneity and both kinds of delegation, with the effect on external
delegation being larger and more significant, as predicted in the theory section
above. Substantively, a change in the heterogeneity of parties from a middle
level of zero to a high level of one increases the probability of external
delegation by nearly fifty percent; the same change in heterogeneity increases
the probability of internal delegation by only twelve percent.
When both heterogeneity and number of parties are included in the probit
analysis, as in Table 8, the significance of both of these variables for external
delegation remains high. This implies that both heterogeneity and number of
parties have independent effects on the choice of external delegation.
Table 8: Results of Probit Analysis of Heterogeneity and Number of Parties and
Delegation
Independent Variables
Heterogeneity
Number of Parties

Dependent Variable 1
External Delegation
0.837‡
(0.369)
0.424‡
(0.176)

Dependent Variable 2
Internal Delegation
0.456
(0.32)
-0.028
(0.150)

Sample Size = 91
Standard Errors are in Parentheses
‡ p<0.05
Substantively, when controlling for the number of parties, the effect of a
change in the heterogeneity of members from zero to one on the probability of
external delegation decreases slightly to thirty-one percent, while it leaves the
marginal effect of heterogeneity on the probability of internal delegation nearly
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unchanged. In addition, controlling for heterogeneity slightly reduces the effect
of the number of parties on the probability of external delegation to 6.5%,
while the number of parties, controlling for heterogeneity, does not affect the
probability of internal delegation.61
The results in Tables 6–8 confirm the prediction that larger and more
heterogeneous groups of states are more likely to choose external rather than
internal delegation.
C. Other Possible Explanatory Variables
Other explanatory variables (democracy, the presence of a superpower, and
the member states’ level of risk aversion), while not stemming from Rational
Design, are common control variables in empirical analyses of international
relations.62 Democracy is measured by the mean polity score of treaty
signatories.63 As Table 9 illustrates, both forms of delegation are less common
when the parties are democracies than when they are not.
Table 9: Results of Probit Analysis of Democracy and Delegation
Dependent Variable 1
Dependent Variable 2
Independent Variable
External Delegation
Internal Delegation
Democracy
-0.100†
-0.069‡
(Polity score)
(0.032)
(0.031)
Sample Size = 97
Standard Errors are in Parentheses
‡ p<0.05
† p<0.01
More concretely, as the average level of democracy among parties to an
agreement changes from zero (representing a relatively heterogeneous group of
members) to ten (representing an agreement in which all the members are
democracies), the probability of external delegation decreases by thirty-seven
percent and the probability of internal delegation decreases by twenty-five
percent.
What might explain this striking finding? One possible explanation is that
these findings may relate to those on heterogeneity: when more signing states

61. Marginal effect of heterogeneity is calculated holding number of parties (logged) at its mean
(1.437) and the marginal effect of the number of parties is found holding heterogeneity at its mean (0.309).
62. It could be argued that the presence of a superpower partly captures the asymmetry of power
that is part of the variable, number, in rational design. Nonetheless, this is an imperfect measure at best.
Some quantification of the power of the other signatories would be needed so that a measure of the
discrepancy in power among agreement members could be created.
63. “Polity” is one of the most widely used measures of democracy. Among the dimensions of
democracy captured in Polity are chief-executive constraints and the competitiveness of political
participation.
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are democracies, perhaps they are also more homogeneous, with similar
preferences and similar interests. One way of investigating this possibility is to
look at the correlation coefficient between the two variables, democracy and
heterogeneity. It turns out that the correlation is -0.3552, with a p-value of 0.006
(and thus statistically significant); hence democracies are quite homogeneous, at
least in terms of the measure used here, which is similar voting patterns in the
United Nations General Assembly. Still, there are other possible explanations.
It may be that democracies are more able to use informal mechanisms in their
cooperation. Finally, perhaps democracies worry more than nondemocracies
about the democratic values that international delegations might compromise—
for example, participation, accountability, and responsiveness.64 In any event,
more in-depth research is needed to explain this finding.
Considered next is whether the presence of a superpower among the
signatories affects the probability of having external or internal delegation.65 A
superpower may be reluctant to delegate authority and reduce its autonomy.
Yet a superpower signatory does not significantly change the probability of
either type of delegation. In addition, the substantive effect of a superpower
signatory is very small for both external and internal delegation. Having the
United States or another superpower like the former Soviet Union as a
signatory increases the probability of external delegation by two percent, while
it reduces the probability of internal delegation by ten percent.
Finally, anarchy could make risk-averse states cautious about delegating,
especially delegating important tasks such as monitoring, implementation, and
dispute resolution. As early as James Madison, those writing about delegation
have demonstrated that delegated power can be used against the principal
delegating it.66 Of course, the development of delegation theory has focused on
how contracts can be structured to minimize risks like agency slippage.67 The

64. See Neil Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 93 (Winter 2008).
65. The superpower variable is equal to one if the U.S. or the USSR was a signatory and zero
otherwise.
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (arguing that the legislative process is constructed
to include an executive and a bicameral legislative branch in order to limit “excess law-making” which
can result through delegation). His point is that delegation can be dangerous when it makes policy
change and the construction of new laws too easy since this can lead to an abuse of power.
67. The literature has dealt with the issue of constraining agent “slippage” by emphasizing that the
preferences of the agent and the principal are seldom aligned. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 30 (1985).
The principal may, therefore, choose or construct an agent that has similar preferences. DARREN G.
HAWKINS & WADE JACOBY, How Agents Matter, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 199–228 (David A. Lake et al. eds., 2006). Principals may also do this by limiting the
powers or mandate of the institution or by restricting the specialization of the agent to limit
opportunism. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLPH RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY:
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 265–81 (2000); RODERICK D.
KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION 25 (1991).
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bottom line, however, is that tradeoffs are inherently involved.68 The traditional
view, in summary, is that “[t]he potential for inferior outcomes, loss of
authority, and diminution of sovereignty makes states reluctant to accept hard
legalization—especially when it includes significant levels of delegation.”69 Thus,
states facing enforcement problems are less likely to include delegated disputeresolution provisions in their international agreements. Moreover, since
external delegation may be harder for states to control, and thus imply more
risk, this effect is likely to be larger for external delegation than for internal
delegation.
The four different probit analyses test the relationship between risk aversion
and delegation overall as well as the delegation of monitoring, implementation,
and dispute resolution.70 Risk aversion and delegation do not appear to be
significantly related, except in the case of the internal delegation of disputeresolution provisions, suggesting that states seek the benefits they can derive
from delegation despite the risks involved. In other words, states are not singlemindedly avoiding risk as many Realists would predict; rather, they make
tradeoffs based on cost-benefit calculations. Still, a more fine-grained analysis is
called for once a greater data set allows it. For example, among other things,
one would need to look into whether states can opt out of the delegated dispute
resolution by adding reservations to the agreements.71
D. Relationship Between Delegation and Other Design Provisions
Examining the relationship between delegation and other design provisions
logically begins by describing other work that has been pursued on the
relationship between delegation of dispute resolution and the degree of
precision of an agreement’s main substantive goals.

68. For classic statements reflecting this view, see generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 775, 775–95 (1972);
Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288–307 (1980).
69. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG. 421, 437 (2000).
70. All of these analyses use Bueno de Mesquita’s risk-attitude measure, which uses a state’s
alliance portfolio to determine its level of risk aversion. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap
Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 156, 158–59 (1985). Specifically, the
closer a state is to having an alliance portfolio that maximizes its security, the more risk-averse it is
presumed to be. In EUGene (Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program), this risk
attitude variable ranges from –1 (very risk-averse) to +1 (very risk-acceptant) and is based on region.
See generally Scott D. Bennett & Allan C. Stam, A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War,
44 INT’L STUD. Q. 451 (2000). To measure risk attitudes in bilateral treaties, I calculate each signatory’s
risk attitude towards the other’s region. For multilateral treaties, I find the mean of each signatory’s
regional risk scores. I use a “weakest link” assumption, and measure the agreement as a function of the
risk attitude of the most risk-averse signatory. Finally, I invert the scale to create a measure of riskaversion with –1 being the least risk-averse and +1 being the most risk-averse.
71. In fact, whether states are prohibited or not from adding reservations is another facet of
institutional design that deserves further study.
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1. Delegation and Precision
Delegation of dispute-resolution authority in an international agreement
should be inversely related to the degree of precision accorded to the
agreement’s substantive goals.72 A bivariate probit model indeed reveals a
statistically significant inverse relationship between these two design variables.
Moreover, consistent with the results above, the variable complex cooperation
problem has a positive and significant effect on dispute-resolution delegation
provisions. 73
2. Delegation and Withdrawal Clauses
There are several hypotheses for why the use of delegation may be
associated with the use of withdrawal clauses. In their article, Bradley and
Kelley capture the notion of withdrawal clauses by considering the permanence
of the delegated body and whether it is easy or difficult for states to remove
themselves from the jurisdiction of the delegated body or the associated
agreement, or both.74 They suggest that even the existence of withdrawal clauses
might not remove the practical difficulty of removing oneself from an
agreement or from part of an agreement, especially if one agreement is
embedded within others as is the case for the European Convention on Rights
and the Council of Europe.75
On the other hand, in her paper for this symposium, Hathaway argues that
withdrawal clauses may serve to protect states against time-inconsistent
preferences—that is, cases in which state preferences change over time.76 Such
clauses allow states to remove themselves from forms of delegation that they
find increasingly counter to their revised interests. This is very similar to the
Koremenos argument that “[w]ithdrawal clauses are responses to shocks that
alter a state’s basic interest in cooperation.”77 These shocks are rare, but the risk
they impose is great. Hence withdrawal clauses are pervasive, but not used very
frequently.78 In this sense, withdrawal clauses play a role similar to that of
provisions that allow states to revoke authority from a delegated body or to
remove themselves from its jurisdiction. They provide flexibility and preserve a

72. Koremenos, supra note 39, passim (drawing on Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 58). This
challenges the special issue on legalization, Legalization and World Politics, which does not suggest that
these two design dimensions are substitutes. See Judith Goldstein et al., Legalization and World
Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385 (2000).
73. This is consistent with Koremenos, Which Half, supra note 8, at 207–09. Ehrlich & Posner,
supra note 58, also predict that greater heterogeneity across parties will lead to less precise contracts
and therefore greater delegation of dispute resolution authority.
74. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 24.
75. Id.
76. Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 115 (Winter 2008).
77. Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549,
561 (2005).
78. Id.
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degree of state independence. As a result, one would expect to see withdrawal
clauses in treaties that also include delegation, particularly external delegation.
Table 10 illustrates a significant and positive correlation between delegation
provisions and withdrawal clauses. What this suggests is that delegation is not
trivial for states; rather, it impedes their autonomy. Hence, agreements that call
for delegation, in particular external delegation, are far more likely to include
withdrawal provisions than those that do not.
Table 10: Correlation Between Withdrawal Clause and Delegation

Withdrawal Clause
Sample Size = 97
* p<0.1
† p<0.01

External Delegation
0.4112†

Internal Delegation
0.2083*

3. Delegation and Finite Duration Provisions
Duration provisions provide a form of insurance against shocks that may
influence how an agreement affects state interests.79 Because external
delegation may give some real power to an external body, states may perceive a
higher degree of uncertainty regarding the possible outcomes of such an
agreement that includes delegation. As a result, signing parties may be more
interested in including a finite duration clause as protection against a shock due
to some unexpected action by the delegated body. Although this may be true of
internal delegation to some extent, it is more likely with external delegation. On
the other hand, bodies, whether external or internal, may be able to provide the
kind of flexibility desired by states when faced with such uncertainty. The
bodies can be delegated the authority to adjust the terms of cooperation in
response to shocks. If this is the case, delegation could be a substitute for finite
duration provisions.
The data in Table 11 provide an insight into which of these possible
explanations seems more supported.
Table 11: Correlation Between Finite Duration and Delegation

Finite Duration
Sample Size = 97
* p<0.1
‡ p<0.05
† p<0.01
79. Id. at 549.

External Delegation
-0.174*

Internal Delegation
-0.034
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The results suggest that agreements that include external delegation are less
likely to have finite duration, supporting the latter argument that these bodies
actually provide some desired flexibility. The correlation between internal
delegation and finite duration is nearly zero and is statistically insignificant,
leading to the conclusion that there is no relationship between the two.
E. Multivariate Analysis
As Tables 12 and 13 demonstrate, in the multivariate regression, all the
variables explaining external delegation remain correctly signed, and only
heterogeneity loses statistical significance across both dependent variables.80
This is not surprising, since the sample size is relatively small. Controlling for
heterogeneity, complexity, and democracy, the number of parties still predicts
more external delegation. Substantively, a change from two to three parties
increases the probability of external delegation by seven percent. This lends
additional support to the argument that parties use delegation to reduce
transaction costs, giving more confidence to the Rational Design conjecture that
centralization increases with number. The effect of the number of parties on
internal delegation, although negative, is very small and statistically
insignificant, all other things being equal. If the underlying cooperation
problem is complex, the probability of external delegation increases by thirtysix percent, and the probability of internal delegation increases by seventeen
percent, holding everything else constant. This result is very strong with respect
to external delegation, lending strong support to the Rational Design
hypotheses linking complex cooperation problems to centralization. The change
in democracy lowers the probability of both external and internal delegation by
about thirty-two percent, holding everything else constant.

80. The correlation between number (logged participants) and heterogeneity is 0.6426†, whereas
between democracy (Polity mean) and number (logged participants) it is -0.3363†.
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Table 12: Multivariate Analysis
Independent Variable
Heterogeneity
Number of Parties
(logged)
Complex Problem
Democracy
(Polity score)

Dependent Variable 1
External Delegation
0.549
(0.411)
0.410‡
(0.193)
1.075†
(0.396)
-0.085*
(0.040)

Dependent Variable 2
Internal Delegation
0.254
(0.347)
-0.095
(0.156)
0.448
(0.322)
-0.085‡
(0.035)

Sample Size = 91
Standard Errors are in Parentheses
* p<0.1
‡ p<0.05
† p<0.01

Table 13: Marginal Effects: Multivariate Results
Change in Probability of
External Delegation
(95% confidence
interval)
0.157
(-0.101, 0.322)

Change in Probability
of Internal Delegation
(95% confidence
interval)
0.091
(-0.167, 0.286)

Change of
Heterogeneity from 0 to
1
Change of Number of
0.066
-0.015
Parties from 2 to 3
(0.009, 0.126)
(-0.063, 0.032)
Change in Complex
0.359
0.167
Problem from 0 to 1
(0.116, 0.556)
(-0.064, 0.369)
Change in the Mean
-0.322
-0.318
Democracy from 0 to 10 (-0.574, 0.032)
(-0.525, -0.075)
Note: For each marginal effect, the other variables where held at either their
mean or mode for binary variables (for example, complex problem).
VI
CONCLUSION
This article takes a first, systematic look at the incidence of delegation
across a random sample of agreements. Not only is delegation widespread;
these results also confirm the observable implications of the Rational Design
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project, which were deduced and articulated five years earlier—long before any
of the current data had been collected. This article is therefore a contribution to
a broader research agenda on rational institutional design as well as on
international delegation.
A number of interesting empirical findings stand out. For example, states
delegate the least in the security issue area, but when they do delegate, they
tend to use external delegation almost twice as much as internal delegation.
More theoretical and empirical work needs to be done to explain such findings.
For instance, do state representatives in security agreements feel that when they
must delegate, they want a more neutral third party to lessen the risk of any
conflict escalation? Another striking finding is how little states use unanimity or
even supermajority voting rules to protect themselves or to limit delegated
authority.
Additionally, the findings on heterogeneity leading to less delegation
contrast with the predictions in the work of Hawkins et al.81 The predictions
presented here are theoretically based on the work of Erhlich and Posner, who
focus on dispute resolution.82 The findings are based on data concerning all
forms of delegation, including the delegation of dispute resolution, and across
four issue areas, whereas the work of Hawkins et al. focuses on a particular kind
of delegation: the implementation of policy.
The analyses in this article all focus on the internal–external delegation
distinction. This distinction is warranted, given the statistically significant
differences between the two types of delegation in the analyses presented here.
Bradley and Kelley suggest that there are significant differences among
international delegations beyond the internal–external distinction.83 Empirically,
with a larger number of agreements in the sample, researchers can begin to
break down the analyses and probe what kind of delegation is present in each
issue area as well as investigate the voting rules and the particular
characteristics of the states involved.
Another interesting analysis that would be possible with a larger data set is
to match specific cooperation problems with various kinds of delegation,
including the external–internal distinction, and to probe whether the prediction
in Hawkins et al.84 on the delegation of policy implementation holds up across a
larger set of agreements. The initial results in this article show that such future
research is promising and should be conducted.
Additionally, as more data become available, multivariate and interactive
analyses should be employed to achieve not only a greater level of certainty
about the relative importance of delegation for different cooperation problems,
but also a more sophisticated understanding of under what conditions which
particular tasks will be delegated.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Hawkins et al., supra note 59, at 21.
See generally Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 58.
See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 1–2.
Hawkins et al., supra note 59, at 21.
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Finally, increasing the sample will also allow a time-series analysis. This is
not trivial, given that one set of questions we can then study will be the effects
of the bipolar world on delegation and membership in those agreements that
call for delegation. For instance, the bipolar world may have inhibited
widespread and deep delegation to global organizations; on the other hand,
perhaps the bodies that were created during the Cold War were narrow in terms
of membership but called for substantial delegation. So, polarity (whether the
world be bipolar as it used to be or unipolar as it is now) may affect the scope
and depth of delegation as well as the nature of problems resolved through
international institutions. Another issue that could then be addressed is whether
states increased the amount or depth of delegation to NGOs.
These are significant questions that need to be addressed, and the expansion
of datasets like the one used in this paper will help uncover new puzzles and
provide convincing empirical evidence about the changes occurring in the
international environment as a result of the rise in nonstate actors as well as of
the demise of the Cold War.
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APPENDIX:
TABLES OF AGREEMENTS IN
THE RANDOM SAMPLE ORGANIZED BY SUBJECT
TABLE A-1
FINANCE AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement
Agreement concerning financial
cooperation on the Lake Volta
Transport System.
Convention for the avoidance of
double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income.
Convention for the avoidance of
double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income.
Reciprocal Trade Agreement.
Agreement concerning financial
cooperation.
Agreement for the avoidance of
double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income and
capital gains.
Convention for the avoidance of
double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income.
Agreement concerning the
disposition of certain accounts
in Thailand under Article 16 of
the Treaty of Peace with Japan
of 8 September 1951.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement concerning the
delivery of a linear accelerator
to the Cancer Institute.
Agreement concerning financial
cooperation.

Signatories

Signature Date

Units #

Federal Rep.
Germany–Ghana

1980

21671

Japan–United Arab
Rep.

1968

10576

Belgium–United
Kingdom

1953

2526

1942

81

1986

25472

United Kingdom–
Barbados

1970

10955

Australia–Italy

1982

25393

Multilateral

1953

2913

Denmark–India

1975

14491

Fed. Rep.
Germany–Niger

1978

20214

United States–
Mexico
Fed. Rep.
Germany–
Bangladesh
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Agreement for financing certain
educational exchange programs.
Agreement concerning the
collection of bills, drafts, et
cetera.
Agreement concerning the
compensation of Netherlands’
interests.
Convention for the avoidance of
double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income and
on capital (with protocol).

[Vol. 71:151

United States–
Ecuador

1956

4114

Multilateral

1964

8851

Netherlands–Egypt

1971

11868

Czechoslovakia–
Norway

1979

18930
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TABLE A-2
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement
Agreement for the promotion
and protection of investments.
Agreement concerning financial
assistance.
Foreign Investment Insurance
Agreement.
Agreement for the promotion
and protection of investments.
Convention concerning the
mutual promotion and
protection of investments.
Treaty on the encouragement
and reciprocal protection of
investments of capital.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to the
guaranty of private investments.
Exchange of letters constituting
an agreement relating to
investment guaranties.
Agreement for the promotion
and protection of investments.
Agreement on the mutual
protection of investments (with
exchange of notes).
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to the
guaranty of private investments.
Agreement for the promotion
and protection of investments.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to
investment guaranties.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to
investment guaranties.

Signatories
United Kingdom–
Yemen
Fed. Rep. of
Germany–Tanzania

Signature Date

Units #

1982

22810

1974

14366

Canada–Senegal

1979

24875

United Kingdom–
Panama

1983

24700

France–Syrian Arab
Rep.

1978

19570

Fed. Rep.
Germany–Benin

1978

24681

United States–
Nicaragua

1959

4922

United States–
Colombia

1962

6621

United Kingdom–
Bangladesh

1980

19536

Sweden–China

1982

22733

United Kingdom–
Liberia

1960

5596

United Kingdom–
Egypt

1975

15181

United States–
Zambia

1966

8901

United States–
Cameroon

1967

9855
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Agreement on the mutual
promotion and protection of
investments (with exchange of
letters).
Convention concerning the
encouragement of capital
investment and the protection of
property.
Agreement on processing and
protection of investments (with
exchange of letters).
Agreement concerning the
encouragement and reciprocal
protection of investments.
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France–Haiti

1984

24323

Netherlands–
Tunisia

1963

7558

France–Panama

1982

24235

Denmark–Sri
Lanka

1985

23607
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TABLE A-3
MONETARY AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement Name
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement concerning the
guarantee by the government of
the United Kingdom and the
maintenance of the Minimum
Sterling Proportion by the
Government of Iceland.
Agreement concerning
settlement of the “Special Yen
Problem.”
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement concerning the
guarantee by the government of
the United Kingdom and the
maintenance of the Minimum
Sterling Proportion by the
Government of Libya.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement regarding the
guarantee by the government of
the United Kingdom and the
maintenance of the Minimum
Sterling Proportion by Ireland.
Exchange of notes and
monetary agreement.

Signatories

Signature Date

Units #

Iceland–United
Kingdom

1961

9800

Japan–Thailand

1955

3172

Libya–United
Kingdom

1968

9815

Belgium–United
Kingdom

1947

9374

Netherlands–
United Kingdom

1945

24
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TABLE A-4
TRADE AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement Name
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement concerning grain
to be supplied by the
government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain to the
government of Mali within the
framework of the Cereals Food
Aid Programme of the
European Economic
Community.
Agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities.
Agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities.
Agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities.
Agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities.
Agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities.
International Sugar Agreement,
1973 (with annexes).
Agricultural Commodities
Agreement under Title I of the
Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance
Act (with agreed minutes and
Memorandum of
Understanding).
Agreement for the sale of
agricultural commodities (with
minutes of negotiations of 20
March 1978).
Agreement with respect to
quality wheat.

Signatories

Signature Date

Units #

1975

14430

1968

10249

1973

13092

1972

12254

1970

11046

1974

13629

Multilateral

1973

12951

Israel–United
States

1957

4365

Lebanon–United
States

1978

18143

Multilateral

1962

6389

Mali–United
Kingdom

Dominican
Republic–United
States
Bangladesh–United
States
Republic of
Vietnam–United
States
Paraguay–United
States
Egypt–United
States
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TABLE A-5
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement Name
Agreement concerning financial
cooperation—refuse disposal in
the Freetown Metropolitan
Area.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement on the project soil
management and conservation
in East Amazonia.
Agreement on cooperation in
the field of environmental
protection.
Agreement on cooperation in
the field of environmental
protection (with agreed
minutes).
Agreement concerning the
protection of frontier forests
against fire.
Community-Cost Concentration
Agreement on a concerted
action project in the field of
analysis of organic
micropollutants in water.
Exchange of letters constituting
an agreement concerning the
free passage of salmon in
Vanern Lake.
International Convention (with
annexes) for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil.
Memorandum of Understanding
on cooperation in earth sciences
and environmental studies.
Agreement for plant
protection—Sudan quelea bird
research project.
Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas.

Signatories

Signature Date

Units #

Fed. Rep. of
Germany–Sierra
Leone

1980

21678

Brazil–Fed. Rep. of
Germany

1984

23031

German
Democratic
Republic–Sweden

1976

20644

Japan–United
States

1975

15109

Argentina–Chile

1961

9075

Multilateral

1980

20754

Norway–Sweden

1969

14017

Multilateral

1954

4714

United Kingdom–
United States

1979

19699

Sudan–United
States

1977

17308

Multilateral

1958

8164
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Agreement on cooperation in
the field of environmental
protection.
African Migratory Locust
Convention.
International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage.
International Convention for
the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (with Final Act and
Resolution adopted by the
Conference of
Plenipotentiaries).
Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living
Resources in the Baltic Sea and
the Belts.
Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution.
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United Kingdom–
USSR

1974

13920

Multilateral

1952

10476

Multilateral

1969

14097

Multilateral

1966

9587

Multilateral

1973

16710

Multilateral

1979

21623
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TABLE A-6
HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement Name
Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.
Convention on the nonapplicability of statutory
limitations to war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
OAU Convention governing the
specific aspects of refugee
problems in Africa.
Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine.
Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally
Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents.
Agreement on the fundamental
rights of nationals.
Protocol relating to refugee
seamen.
International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid.
Convention (with Final
Protocol) concerning the
reciprocal grant of assistance to
distressed persons.
Convention (No. 19) concerning
equality of treatment for
national and foreign workers as
regards workmen’s
compensation for accidents.

Signatories

Signature Date

Units #

Multilateral

1948

1021

Multilateral

1968

10823

Multilateral

1969

14691

Multilateral

1950

2889

Multilateral

1966

14668

Multilateral

1997

N/A

Multilateral

1973

15410

Congo–France

1974

21833

Multilateral

1973

13928

Multilateral

1973

14861

Multilateral

1951

2647

Multilateral

1925

602
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Convention (No. 98) concerning
the application of the principles
of the right to organize and to
bargain collectively.
Constitution of the International
Refugee Organization and
agreement on interim measures
to be taken in respect of
refugees and displaced persons.
American Convention on
Human Rights Pact of San José,
Costa Rica.
Convention (No. 143)
concerning migrations in
abusive conditions and the
promotion of equality of
opportunity and treatment of
migrant workers.
Convention of establishment.
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Multilateral

1949

1341

Multilateral

1946

283

Multilateral

1969

17955

Multilateral

1975

17426

France–Mali

1977

20762
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TABLE A-7
SECURITY AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Agreement Name
Convention on the prohibition
of the development, production,
and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and
toxin weapons and on their
destruction.
Convention on prohibitions or
restrictions on the use of certain
conventional weapons which
may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or to have
indiscriminate effects.
Treaty on the prohibition of the
emplacement of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction on the seabed
and the ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof.
Interim Agreement on certain
measures with respect to the
limitation of strategic offensive
arms.
Convention on the prohibition
of military or any other hostile
use of environmental
modification techniques.
Agreement governing the
activities of states on the moon
and other celestial bodies.
Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America (with annexed
Additional Protocols I and II).

Signatories

Signature Date

Units #

Multilateral

1972

14860

Multilateral

1980

22495

Multilateral

1971

13678

USSR–United
States

1972

13445

Multilateral

1976

17119

Multilateral

1979

23002

Multilateral

1967

9068

06__KOREMENOS.DOC

192

6/9/2008 8:04:12 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to
military assistance: eligibility
requirement pursuant to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1973
and the International Security
Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to
assurances under the Mutual
Security Act of 1951.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to
military assistance: eligibility
requirements pursuant to the
International Security
Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to mutual
security.
Cooperation agreement on civil
defense and security.
Exchange of notes constituting
and agreement relating to
mutual security.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to mutual
security.
Exchange of notes constituting
an agreement relating to mutual
security.
Security Agreement concerning
certain exchanges of secret
information.
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Greece–United
States

1976

16035

Portugal–United
States

1952

2799

Malaysia–United
States

1977

17310

Belgium–United
States

1952

2356

France–Morocco

1981

20783

Luxembourg–
United States

1952

2384

Italy–United States

1952

2365

Turkey–United
States

1952

2361

France–Sweden

1973

14951

